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SEXUAL AND GENDER VARIATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW: FROM MALIGNANT TO BENIGN TO PRODUCTIVE
William N. Eskridge, Jr.
Sexuality, gender, and the law now constitutes an important field of legal inquiry
and scholarship. This Article traces the evolution of the "big idea" in this area:
Contrary to natural law assumptions, the nation is moving decisively toward the
norm that sexual and gender variation are typically benign and not malignant.
Today, this liberal norm is hotly contested by both traditionalists who oppose legal
reforms that require them to accommodate sexual and gender minorities, and
progressives who argue that the norm should be pressed more aggressively to assail
status quo institutions such as marriage. The notion that sexual and gender variation
is benign and can be educational continues to revolutionize American constitutional
as well as statutory law.
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INTRODUCTION
Sexuality, gender, and the law today stands as an established field of legal
scholarship and teaching.' The premise of this area of law is that legal rules and
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
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standards pervasively reflect, regulate, and are undermined by the diversity of
gender roles, sexual practices, and gender or sexual identities in a society. The
social background of this premise-the background conditions that make pos-
sible this area of law-is our collective understanding that biological "sex"
(man or woman) does not inevitably determine one's "gender" (traits, char-
acteristics, and social roles) or one's "sexual orientation" (preferred sexual
partners or activities). This background understanding then motivates intense
debate about what role the state should (or can) play in molding gender or
sexual identities and channeling gender roles and sexual practices.
Sexuality, gender, and the law was not a conceivable field of inquiry in this
country before the Civil War because "sex" was the only relevant classification
and because there was not sufficient normative debate about the nation's
regulation of sexual activities (for example, the criminalization of nonmarital
intercourse) and gendered hierarchies (for example, the exclusion of women
from the franchise, juries, and professions). Part I of this Article traces this social
phenomenon and the initial legal response in the United States, which treated
variation as per se malignant and sought to prohibit, regulate, or expunge it.
The twentieth century witnessed a decline in this "natural law" model for
the legal system. As a descriptive matter, Americans recognized that gender
roles and sexual proclivities are often different from those demanded by natural
law. Confronted with mounting evidence of the independence of gender and
sexuality from sex, many Americans believed that the state needed to inter-
vene to preserve or restore the "natural" order. Pushing back against this
impulse as a prescriptive matter, feminists, lesbian and gay activists, and trans
advocates and their allies, maintained that variation in gender, sexuality, and
even sex is typically benign. That is, significant and increasing sexual, gender,
and sex variation is not necessarily a matter for normalizing state interventions.
Part II provides a broad outline of the social and intellectual forces pressing
Americans toward the notion first that most variations are tolerable, and then
that some variations ought to be recognized as entirely benign.
By and large, the concept of benign sexual, gender, and sex variation has
been articulated as a liberal norm: Gender and sexuality are independent of
biological sex, and the state has no business coercing or perhaps even
1. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALIrY, GENDER AND THE LAW
(1st ed. 1998, 2d ed. 2004, abr. ed. 2006, 3d ed. forthcoming 2011); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEX
EQUALITY (Ist ed. 2001, 2d ed. 2007) (sex equality understood through the prism of sexuality and gender);
see also MARY E. BECKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY (1st ed. 1994, 2d ed. 2001, 3d ed. 2007); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEiN, CARLOS BALL &JANE
SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 2008) (sexual
orientation casebook whose third edition was refocused to include broader issues of sexuality and gender).
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encouraging people to adhere to a collectively determined ideal of standardized
gender roles and sexualities. The state ought not force sexual and gender minori-
ties to conform to the old naturalized categories, including one-man, one-woman
marriage. Given the benign nature of sexual and gender variation, society and
the state ought to provide both freedom and equal opportunities to lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, transgendered persons, and intersexuals, so that they may
live flourishing lives.
This idea has had dramatic implications for American public law. It put
a public face on the constitutional privacy right, reconnected equal protec-
tion law to social prejudice, and sexualized the First Amendment. At the same
time, its success has spawned a traditional family values countermovement that
seeks to position gay equality as a threat to the privacy and free speech rights
of religious persons, many of whom now see themselves as an embattled minority
oppressed by the state.
The debate between liberal and neo-natural law stances is not the last
word, however. Part III examines issues of sexuality, gender, and the law through
a "post-liberal" perspective. The basic descriptive insight of most post-liberal
thinking is that sex, gender, and sexuality are interdependent, not independ-
ent. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, maintains that subordinate gender
role is driven not so much by sex as by sexuality. Michel Foucault argues that
sexuality is a social construction, related to gender and sex but also a separate
production. Judith Butler says that biological sex itself is a product of gender
and heterosexuality. These otherwise different philosophies share the basic
normative insight that the state cannot be neutral and thus bears some respon-
sibility for the construction of sex, gender, and sexuality in a society. This means
that the norms surrounding, and often coercing, sex, gender, and sexuality
ought to be deliberated about in communities where multiple voices are heard.
In such an ongoing conversation, sexual and gender variation is not just toler-
able (the weak liberal idea) or benign (the stronger liberal claim), but positively
productive (the post-liberal contention). Variation provides a lever for
reforming unjust features of the status quo.
This Article closes with some observations about how the evolution of
discourse concerning sexuality, gender, and the law has transformed the
constitutional doctrines of privacy, equal protection, and freedom of speech.
The sexualized privacy right has not only been unmoored from its traditional
connection to procreative marriage, but has become a mechanism for
transforming marriage itself. Cases involving sex, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion discrimination have dislodged the U.S. Supreme Court from the double
standard created by its race discrimination cases and helped move equal
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protection doctrine toward a sliding scale of scrutiny. Finally, the imperial
First Amendment now protects sexualized and gendered identity speech,
including that of religious minorities who self-identify as nongay and tradi-
tionally gendered.2
I. THE NATURAL LAW MODEL: NATURAL SEX-BASED ROLES
AND MALIGNANT VARIATION
In the colonial era and the early nineteenth century, American society and
law were organized around the biological binary of "man" and "woman." What
we would call a person's gendered traits or roles and her or his sexuality were,
linguistically as well as culturally, indistinguishable from the biological catego-
ries. Nineteenth-century Americans understood "gender" to be "[a] sex, male or
female"3 and "sexuality" to be "[tihe state of being distinguished by sex.'" Each
sex carried with it assumed traits and roles that were considered essential features
of being a man or a woman. The traits and roles were intimately tied to procrea-
tion within marriage: A woman's highest calling was to be a wife and a mother,
so that her sex-based roles were private, domestic, and nurturing; a man's
highest calling was to be the head of the household, so that his sex-based roles
were public, economic, and civic.
These assumptions about naturalized categories of man and woman struc-
tured public life in pre-Civil War America. Power and authority were vested
securely in the hands of (white) men, who were presumed fit to run the nation's
businesses, staff the militia and national armed forces, and serve as public
officials. Not everyone adhered to these naturalized roles: Some women and
men did not marry, some marriages produced no children, and slaves and some
servants were denied the dignities (including the right to marry) afforded free
white men. But among America's governing classes-namely, those Americans
2. By deeming it "imperial," I suggest that the First Amendment has expanded in the last genera-
tion, reaching into ever more arenas of society and governance.
3. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 90 (1828)
(definition of "gender"); cf. LINDLEY MURRAY, ENGLISH GRAMMAR (5th ed. 1824) (defining gender as
"the distinction of nouns with regard to sex"). Twentieth-century editions of Webster's listed this
definition as "obsolete" but did not replace it with a modem definition until Webster's Third was published
in 1961. Since 1961, Webster's has defined "gender" as "the behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits
typically associated with one sex." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 944 (3d ed. 1961).
4. WEBSTER, supra note 3, at 69 (definition of "sexuality"). Subsequent nineteenth-century
editions essentially repeated this definition, until Webster's Second, published in 1934, which defined
"sexuality" as the "[q]uality or state of being sexual; possession or exercise of sexual functions, appetites,
etc." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2297 (William
Allen Nielson et al. eds., 1934).
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who could vote, serve on juries, and who formed the core of the armed
forces-these naturalized categories were nearly universal in their command.
What we today would consider gender and sexuality were virtually invisible to
American culture before the Civil War because sexual impulses and gender
roles were thought to be tied both descriptively (as a matter of nature) and
prescriptively (as a matter of God-given natural law rules) to one's status as a
man/woman, husband/wife, and father/mother. Figure 1, below, diagrams the
natural law understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality according to the social,
political, and legal features associated with being a man or woman.
Figure 1. The Natural Law Model of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality
American law before 1861 pervasively reflected and provided normative
confirmation for this natural law understanding. State-supported marriage was
the central regulatory institution: Free men and women were strongly encouraged
to enter it, and within that institution they were governed by rigid rules. Thus,
state criminal codes channeled sexual activities into procreative (penile-vaginal)
intercourse within marriage by declaring fornication and adultery (intercourse
Sexual and Gender Variation 1337
HeinOnline  -- 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1337 2009-2010
outside of marriage), sodomy (nonprocreative anal intercourse), and seduction
(intercourse with a minor incapable of marrying) to be serious felonies.'
Children born outside of marriage were subject to social disadvantages and legal
exclusions.6 Because they were socially and sometimes legally excluded from
most occupations, women had powerful economic incentives to marry men;
once married, women were legally "covered" by their husbands.7 Married women
could not own property, enter into contracts, or engage in litigation without
the consent of their husbands.8 American public law also embraced the natural
law understanding. Voting, jury service, and military service were limited to
free (white) men.9
The natural law paradigm was not unchallenged in nineteenth-century
America. Increasing numbers of women objected to coverture within the family
and exclusion from participatory rights in the body politic.'" Thousands of
women "passed" as men to exercise these rights, and not a few women served in
the armed forces." Other women defied the natural law ideal by refusing to
marry and even more by engaging in sex work outside of marriage. 2 Many men,
in turn, engaged in nonmarital or nonprocreative sexual activities-usually
behind closed doors-but those doors were occasionally thrust open. The
target of a few volleys well before 1861, the legal regime of the natural law
model came under intense fire after the Civil War.
Industrialization and tremendous population growth brought public
displays of deviation from the natural law regime to America's largest cities in
5. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA,
1861-2003, at 24 (2008); see generally NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
AND THE NATION 126-32, 160 (2000) (listing state criminal laws enforcing marital monogamy);
JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC 66-133 (1993) (collecting colonial and early
American statutes criminalizing fornication, adultery, sodomy, etc.).
6. Cf. COTT, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing the unequal status of children born outside of
marriage).
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 430 (1765)
(discussing the merger, or covering, of a wife's identity with that of her husband upon marriage).
8. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 115-16 (2000) (describing Blackstone's
theory of coverture).
9. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991); Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and
Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE LJ. 473 (1997).
10. On feminist objections to coverture and campaigns to revoke it, see NORMA BASCH, IN THE
EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NNETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK
(1982); ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN,
1800-1861 (1987).
11. San Francisco Lesbian and Gay History Project, "She Even Chewed Tobacco": A Pictorial
Narrative of Passing Women in America, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND
LESBIAN PAST 183 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds., 1989).
12. See TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE
COMMERCIAUZATION OF SEX, 1790-1920 (1994).
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the three generations after the Civil War (roughly 1865-1946). Feminists
demanded the end of coverture, campaigned for legal rights to own property and
enter contracts, objected to compulsory motherhood and large families, sought
the right to vote and serve on juries, and insisted on educational, professional,
and other economic opportunities." Other social developments shocked and
challenged the dominance of the old model. The yellow press and moralists
bombarded society with evidence of cross-dressing women, women who lived
with other women in "Boston marriages," and women who renounced marriage
for sex work or relations with other women.'" Also alarming to polite society was
evidence that cities were teeming with men who dressed as women, engaged in
oral and anal intercourse with other men (often for compensation), and solicited
men as well as women in public places."
Although traditionalists were compelled to allow wives some legal rights
and all women the right to vote, they responded to the new urban challenges by
reasserting and modernizing the natural law norm. 6 Thus, "unnatural" gender
roles and sexual practices were freshly presented in medical terms, as degener-
ate and inverted, and in civic terms as endangering vulnerable children and
polluting public culture.'7 Medical professionals, civic leaders, and moral cru-
saders supported new forms of coercive regulation. The reassertion of the
modernized natural law model in the United States between 1861 and 1961
inspired dozens of legal responses, including the following:
13. See ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978).
14. See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP
AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT (1981) (documenting
examples of female relationships and women in "Boston marriages"); RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST
SISTERHOOD. PRosTTUION IN AMERICA, 1900-1918 (1982) (exploring the rise of sex work among
working class women).
15. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 43-46 (documenting the emergence of visible and infuriating
subcultures of female sex workers and male "fairies" in the two generations after the Civil War).
16. CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA 176-81 (1985); see, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996) (arguing that lawmakers and jurists
responded to women's demands for autonomy with a "modernized" discourse that rearticulated natural
law ideas in modem terms).
17. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 23-31, 46-49 (noting the modernization of the discourse of
disgust and contagion that was the basis for natural law disapproval of sexual and gender minorities).
For contemporary examples, see HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX: SEXUAL
INVERSION 261-63 (3d ed. 1927); WILLIAM LEE HOWARD, THE PERVERTS (1901); William Lee
Howard, Effeminate Men and Masculine Women, 71 N.Y. MED. J. 686 (1900).
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* new and increasingly detailed criminal prohibitions against bawdy
houses and sex work, sexual solicitation, cross-dressing, oral sex, child
molestation, abortion, and contraception;"
* new civil exclusions of "degenerate" women and men from entry into
the United States as immigrants, service in the armed forces, profes-
sional licensing, and service at licensed liquor establishments; 9
* new and more vigorously enforced censorship of literature and pam-
phlets depicting "unnatural" or "perverted" sexual practices,
handbooks instructing or even discussing abortion and contraception,
and bans on the sale or importation of lewd plays and movies as well
as novels."
Confronted with increasing evidence of variation from natural law gender
roles and sexual behavior, America's governing classes responded by modernizing
and medicalizing the morals-based natural law model, and mobilizing state
administrative structures to give legal force to the traditionalist norm.
II. THE LIBERAL NORM: TOLERABLE OR BENIGN SEXUAL
AND GENDER VARIATION
The twentieth century witnessed a sea change in understandings about
sexuality and gender in the United States. A critical mass of Americans who
significantly and publicly deviated from the natural law norm joined together
to form social movements after World War 1I. These included women who
worked outside the home and otherwise participated in public life; women
who openly supported the use of contraceptives (and, later, abortions) to limit
the size of families; sexually cohabiting couples who were not married; cross-
dressing women and men; urban subcultures of "homosexuals" (later, lesbians
and gay men); and transgendered and intersexual persons." Typically urban
18. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
17-34 (1999) (discussing the new crimes of cross-dressing, homosexual solicitation, and oral sex);
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN
AMERICA (1998) (examining the development of child molestation crimes); ROSEN, supra note 14
(examining crimes of commercial sexual solicitation and bawdy houses).
19. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 18, at 34-40, 43-52 (documenting civil exclusions for "degenerates"
and "perverts" in immigration law, military service, and licenses).
20. See id. at 32-35, 46-49 (discussing state and federal censorship of materials even mentioning
homosexuality or depicting homosexual relationships).
21. See LISA DUGGAN, SAPPHIC SLASHERS: SEX, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICAN MODERNITY
(2000) (independent women and lesbian subcultures); ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 138-39 ("homosexuals"
and gender minorities); JOANNE MEYEROWrTZ, HOW SEX CHANGED. A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 14-167 (2002) (gender benders and transgendered persons); ELIZABETH
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residents, these Americans challenged long-held assumptions and pushed the
country towards a new view of sex, gender, and sexuality.
The ascendant population of gender and sexual variants served both as an
audience and ultimately an advocacy group for a new understanding of the
relationship among biological sex, gender traits and roles, and sexual practices
and preferences. The sexual and gender revolution of the 1960s was the
context within which these social movements gained mass energy. Freed from
procreation by the new birth control pill, sexually liberated women stood at the
fore of a whole generation of Americans who rejected traditional gender roles
and dress codes, compulsory heterosexuality, and even marriage."
The emerging regime recognized a wide range of gender and sexual
variation as tolerable or (more ambitiously) as benign. Benign variation suggests
that no gender role is inevitably "best" for every woman or every man, and no
sexual practice or orientation is inevitably "best" for every person. The impli-
cation for law is that the state should not force a diverse population into
traditional natural law molds; the state must tolerate a wide array of gender iden-
tities and sexual practices.
Conceptually, the parent of the new norm was eighteenth-century British
philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Contrary to the natural law model, Bentham
argued that human beings properly seek "utility," their own pleasure and happi-
ness, rather than conformity with the "natural" order." Consequently, the goal
of law ought to be overall social utility-namely, the greatest good for the
greatest number.24 In an unpublished essay, Bentham urged that the British law
against consensual sodomy be repealed, because it harmed people who enjoyed
that activity and did not serve offsetting social purposes.25 The sodomy essay
illustrates the key argument for a libertarian approach to consensual sexual
behavior: So long as personal choices do not harm third parties or invade the
public sphere, the state should tolerate them.26 Although Bentham's 1785 essay
REIS, BODIES IN DOUBT: AN AMERICAN HISTORY OF INTERSEX (2009) (history of the intersexuals'
rights movement).
22. See, e.g., SWINGING SINGLE: REPRESENTING SEXUALTXY IN THE 1960S (Hilary Radner &
Moya Luckett eds., 1999).
23. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 476 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (1821)
(appendix on "Offenses Against Taste" added by the editor from Bentham's notes).
24. Id.
25. Jeremy Bentham, Offences Against One's Self: Paederasty (1785) (written 1785, annotated
1816), published in two parts in 3 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389 (1978) [hereinafter Bentham, Part I] and 4 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 91-107 (1978) [hereinafter Bentham, Part 11].
26. Bentham, Part II, supra note 25, at 94-98 (finding consensual sodomy law grounded upon
"antipathy," which is an irrational basis for regulation); Bentham, Part I, supra note 25, at 389-90
(distinguishing between consensual private sodomy, which should be left alone, and nonconsensual or
public sodomy, which should be regulated).
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was never published, it presaged the libertarian philosophy later developed by
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859), and its specific prescriptions regarding sex
crimes were popularized by Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion (1915).27 Femi-
nists such as Margaret Sanger made Benthamite arguments for providing
women with birth control information and devices to control the size of their
families. The famous German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld also agreed with
Bentham and extended his argument to include cross-dressers and other
minority gender identities.28
In early twentieth-century America, feminists were able to secure the
rights to vote and to use contraceptives, but there was little political support for
a libertarian approach to minority gender and sexual roles and practices.
Nonetheless, such an approach was smuggled into American culture by scientists.
Their basic insight was that "nature" produced a lot more variation, most of it
perfectly functional, than the "natural" law model assumed. For example,
Columbia University anthropologists Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead (secret
gender benders and sexual variants themselves) demonstrated that Americans'
obsession with the distinction between masculine and feminine, and the
demonization of "homosexuality," were idiosyncratic to modem western culture
and had no universal applicability, contrary to natural law claims.29 Medical
experts, drawing from Mead and Benedict and their own observations of the
burgeoning urban subcultures of sexual and gender minorities, found a great deal
of natural variation in gender and sexuality, and wondered whether traditional
state regulation was too dogmatic."
A dramatic breakthrough came in the work of an Indiana University
biologist, Professor Alfred Kinsey. His massive empirical analysis of the sexual
practices of white males (1948) and females (1953) revealed that Americans
engaged in a much greater variety of sexual practices (especially homosexual
27. See JOHN S'IART MILL, ON LIBERTY 134-67 (Legal Classics Library 1992) (1859) (giving a
detailed argument for a libertarian presumption against state regulation of private personal activities);
ELLIS, supra note 17, at 346-55 (elaborating on the Benthamite argument against consensual sodomy laws).
28. See MAGNUS HIRSCHFELD, THE HOMOSEXUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN 923-52, 979-
1005 (Michael A. Lombardi-Nash trans., 2000) (1920).
29. RlTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934); MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND
TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES (1935). See generally LOIS BANNER, INTERTWINED
LIVES: MARGARET MEAD, RUTH BENEDICT, AND THEIR CIRCLE 285-376 (2003) (discussing
Benedict's and Mead's parallel critiques of the natural law model); HILARY LAPSLEY, MARGARET MEAD
& RUTH BENEDICT: THE KINSHIP OF WOMEN (2001); Lee Wallace, Academic Recognition: Margaret
Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Sexual Secrecy, 11 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 417 (1999).
30. E.g., Karl M. Bowman, Psychiatric Aspects of the Problem, 22 MENTAL HYGIENE 10, 12-20
(1938); Joseph Wortis, Sex Taboos, Sex Offenders and the Law, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 554-64
(1939).
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activities) and gender performances than law and public culture assumed .
Building on the descriptive account, the studies argued that state regulation
of consensual sexual practices, especially homosexual sodomy, was ridiculously
overbroad and ought to be significantly curtailed for essentially Benthamite
reasons.32 Kinsey, himself a closeted bisexual, also pioneered the idea that
sexuality represented a continuum rather than a binary (heterosexual/
homosexual33 ). Other scientists extended his notion to think about gender iden-
tity, also, as a continuum.34 Dr. John Money and his colleagues at the Johns
Hopkins Medical School demonstrated that even sex itself was not binary;
many intersexual human beings had hormonal patterns, genitals, sexual organs,
and chromosomes that did not match the man/woman binary.35
Introduced at the height of American law's insistence on sexual and gender
conformity in the 195 0s, the combination of a Benthamite political philosophy
and well-publicized scientific evidence of gender and sexual variation inspired a
great deal of reform activities in the 1960s and afterward. The reformers rejected
any claim of a necessary relationship, either descriptively or normatively,
between one's biological sex and one's sexuality or gender. Figure 2, below,
encapsulates the Bentham-inspired "liberal model" of tolerable gender and sexual
variation. As with the natural law model above, the liberal model features both
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions.
31. ALFRED E. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIORS IN THE HUMAN MALE 639-51 (1948)
[hereinafter KINSEY, HUMAN MALE]; ALFRED E. KINSEY El" AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIORS IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 474-75 (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY, HUMAN FEMALE].
32. KINSEY, HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 31, at 8-21. On Kinsey as a moral crusader deploying
science to assault traditional morality, see JAMES H. JONES, ALFRED C. KINSEY: A PUBLIC/PRIVATE LIFE
465-66, 518-33 (1997); PAUL ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX: HAVELOCK ELLIS, ALFRED
KINSEY, WILLIAM MASTERS AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON (1989).
33. KINSEY, HUMAN MALE, supra note 31, at 636-38 (0-6 scale, with 0 being completely
heterosexual and 6 being completely homosexual).
34. HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSEXUAL PHENOMENON 21-22 (1966) (gender identity
continuum).
35. John Money, Joan G. Hampson & John L. Hampson, An Examinaion of Some Basic Sexual
Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97 BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSP. 301 (1955).
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Figure 2. The Liberal Model of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality
As a descriptive matter, the liberal model disaggregates gender and sexuality
from sex. Identifying an individual as a "man" does not tell us precisely what role
he plays in society (he may be a doctor, he may be a nurse, he may be a stay-
at-home dad), what gendered traits he possesses (he may be aggressive, he may be
nurturing), or his preferred sexual practices or partners (he may enjoy procrea-
tive intercourse with women, or he may prefer oral sex with men). As a
normative matter, the liberal model abjures a role for the state that requires or
even encourages a particular relationship among sex, gender, and sexuality. That
is, the law should be neutral with regard to a person's gender identity, sexual
practices, or sexual orientation, unless they pose tangible harms for third parties.36
In the 1950s and 1960s, millions of women, homosexuals and bisexuals, and
transgendered or intersexual persons came to believe that the privileged status
36. The possibility of harm to third parties is foreclosed for variations that are benign and unlikely
for those that are tolerable. For an example of the liberal understanding of state neutrality with regard to
sexual practices as applied by the authors of the Model Penal Code, see Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses
and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 673-86 (1963).
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accorded heterosexual males was unjustified under a Benthamite metric of overall
social good.37 Profoundly inspired by the African American civil rights
movement, these Americans saw the natural law model as a product of prejudice
and stereotypes that denied women and minorities equal treatment." Scientific
claims about natural gender and sexual variation not only inspired legal argu-
ments for reforming the law to tolerate variation, but also constitutional claims
asserting the illegitimacy of laws discriminating upon the basis of sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity.
The motivations and social cohesiveness created by legal discrimination,
combined with a science-based refutation of the natural law model and a general
surge in support for the Benthamite theory of the state, mobilized women and
sexual and gender minorities against the status quo.39 A revived and more united
feminist social movement coalesced in the 1960s to seek abortion choice and the
Equal Rights Amendment. Social and legal activism merged in the National
Organization for Women (formed in 1966), the National Association for the
Repeal of Abortion Laws (1968), and the ACLU's Women's Rights Project
(1970).0 The lesbian and gay rights movement mounted an attack on consen-
sual sodomy laws and antigay discriminations through the Lambda Legal Defense
& Education Fund (1972), the ACLU's Privacy Project (1974), and later its
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project (1985).4 The lesbian and gay rights movement
37. For important and early statements of dissent, see SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX
(H.M. Parshley trans., ed., 1953) (1949); MATTACHINE SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON CONST., art. II
(1963); PRESIDENT'S COMMN ON TIE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN 44-45 (1963); as well
as popular works such as HELEN GURLEY BROWN, SEX AND THE SINGLE GIRL (1962); BETTY FRIEDAN,
THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL
RESPONSE (1966); GORE VIDAL, MYRA BRECKINRIIGE (1968); OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF
GAY LIBERATION (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1972).
38. See NAN ALAMILLA BOYD, WIDE OPEN TOWN: A HISTORY OF QUEER SAN FRANCISCO
TO 1965, at 204-12 (2003) (describing the emerging civil rights consciousness in San Francisco in the
late 1950s/early 1960s); DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION
OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2003) (discussing the emerging civil rights
consciousness in D.C.); William N. Eskridge, Jr., January 27, 1961: The Birth of Gaylegal Equality
Arguments, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L 39 (2001) (similarly focusing on civil rights inspired arguments
in a 1961 cert petition).
39. My account of this process for race, sex, and sexual orientation groups can be found in William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth
Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
40. See generaffy CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACXOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 126-34 (1988); ROSEN, supra note 14. On the women's movement's deployment
of civil rights tropes and arguments, see Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the
Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004).
41. See generaly JOHN IYEMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); ESKRIDGE, supra note 5.
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was particularly law-centered, and the same has been true of similar movements
for transgendered and now intersexual persons."
Espoused by social movements, publicized to great effect by the media,
and litigated by their legal allies, the liberal model of tolerable gender and sexual
variation has worked a revolution in American statutory and constitutional law.
Although neo-natural law countermovements have fought its advancement
at every turn, the tolerable variation agenda reflected in the liberal model is
in the process of triumphing in American public law. The norm itself has been
evolving, toward the notion that sexual and gender variation is not only
tolerable (that is, not as good as the traditional norm, but no danger either),
but is benign (that is, just as good as majority preferences or conditions). Many
laws discriminating against women, gender minorities, and gay or bisexual people
have been repealed.43 Those that remain have been radically recharacterized
according to the liberal norm that justifies state intervention only in the pres-
ence of third-party or public harm.' Although the concepts of "harm" and
"consent" are open to contestation, the public debate now takes place largely
along liberal lines.
A. Sex and Gender Crimes Refocused Around Nonconsent
The most obvious legal implication of the liberal model is that the state
should not render women and sexual and gender minorities outlaws by crimi-
nalizing the activities that allow them to participate in modem society. For
each social movement, decriminalization-of contraception and abortion
(feminists), consensual sodomy (gay people), or cross-dressing (transgendered
42. See MEYEROW1TZ, supra note 21, at 208-54 (tracing the rights-claiming transsexual rights
movement); Noah Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006)
(contrasting the rights claims of transsexuals and intersexuals).
43. In 1960, every state of the United States considered consensual sodomy a crime, almost all the
states excluded these purported "sex criminals" from securing teaching certificates or professional licenses,
no state allowed open lesbians or gay men to serve as police officers or other public servants, most states
discriminated against lesbian or gay parents or caregivers, and not a single state provided protections for gay
people against discrimination or violence. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 18. In 2010, not a single state has an
enforceable consensual sodomy law, very few openly discriminate in state employment or licensing
against gay people, and more than half have statewide laws or executive orders prohibiting employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Lambda Legal, In Your State, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
states-regions (last visited June 1, 2010) (maintaining a state-by-state survey of legal rights and discrimina-
tion against sexual and gender minorities).
44. The best example is the ongoing exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from civil marriage. This
exclusion is now justified largely on liberal rather than moral grounds. Melissa Murray, Marriag Rights &
Parental Rights: Parents, die State, and Proposition 8,5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357 (2009).
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persons)-served as the initial focus of legal reform." Although members of
religious and even medical communities objected to these activities, reformers
countered that they were at least tolerable variations from the natural law
model, because they did not harm third parties or the public. In a remarkable
concession to the liberal model, public defenses of abortion and sodomy laws
after the 1960s focused on asserted harms to fetuses (characterized as human
beings) and children (the supposed victims if a state unleashed homosexuals into
public culture). 46
The last two generations of legal policymakers have reformulated the law of
sex crimes around the notion that private sexual activities between consenting
adults ought not be subject to state criminalization. This was the Benthamite
agenda represented by the American Legal Institute's (ALL) Model Penal Code
(MPC) written in 1962, which urged decriminalization of private and consensual
sexual activities, including fornication, adultery, and sodomy. 47 The MPC also
suggested the substantial decriminalization of abortion.48 Essentially, the ALI's
case for decriminalization asserted that these morally controversial activities (all
condemned by natural law) were tolerable so long as they did not impose harm
on nonconsenting persons (especially minors) or upon public spaces (thus, sexual
solicitation remained a crime). 49 Feminists and other progressive groups sup-
ported these reforms, usually in combination with increased criminalization for
nonconsensual activities such as sexual assault and sexual activities with minors.0
Feminists, gay rights advocates, and transgendered persons also fought, with
virtually uniform success, to repeal or revoke laws criminalizing cross-dressing."1
Repealing consensual sodomy laws proved more difficult, especially between
45. See ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 200-42 (1992) (contraception); ESKRIEXJE, supra note 5, at 109-330
(consensual sodomy); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976) (contraception); Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating
Holloway: Tide VII, Equal Protection, and the Evduion of Transgender Jurisndence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283
(1997) (cross-dressing laws).
46. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIREY PROTEST 44-46 (1994) (discussing pro-life arguments against
abortion); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1338-46 (2000) (noting that antigay discourse
has refocused on the harms gay rights cause children and families).
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (1962) (containing no provisions for penalizing consensual
fornication, adultery, or sodomy).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (distinguishing between
"justified" and "unjustified" abortion).
49. Schwartz, supra note 36 (outlining the libertarian approach to sex crimes taken by the drafters
of the Code).
50. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduc4 61 S. CALL.
REV. 777 (1988).
51. ESKRIDGE, supra note 18, at 111.
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1977 and 1993, when public association of sodomy with homosexuality, child
molestation, and AIDS stalled reform efforts.52 But after 1993, gay rights groups
were able to secure sodomy reform even in some states of the Baptist South and
Mormon West."
Along with revising sex crime laws, the feminist, gay-lesbian, and transgen-
dered social movements successfully persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court to
constitutionalize the liberal model, at least in part, through the recognition of a
right to sexual privacy. 4  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey" and Lawrence v.
Texas,56 the Court explicitly acknowledged the debt its sexual privacy decisions
owed to the liberal concept of tolerable variation." The joint opinion in Casey
observed that, notwithstanding the variety of moral views on the subject,
women ought to have the discretion to choose abortion as well as motherhood.58
But it concluded with the equally liberal observation that the state can
intervene when third-party interests are at stake, including "potential life" once
the viability line has been crossed.59 Significantly, however, the Court refused to
sacrifice a married woman's right to an abortion to claims by her husband; a
woman is an individual and a citizen first, and a wife second.' Likewise,
Lawrence ruled that intimate activities within the home are entitled to presump-
tive protection from state regulation, so long as the conduct does not harm other
persons (in other words, it is consensual) and does not invade public spaces.6
Thus, in Casey and Lawrence, a conservative Supreme Court created a
constitutional floor for activities that remain morally controversial but do not
cross the Benthamite line of harm to third parties or the public. Tolerance of
homosexual sodomy and a woman's right to choose an abortion did not,
52. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 267-69.
53. Id. at 269-78, 289-98 (reporting successful sodomy reform efforts after 1990 in Baptist
Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Arkansas, as well as Montana (with a relatively large Mormon
population) and other states).
54. The leading constitutional privacy cases, Grisudd v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of
contraceptives by married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (use of contraceptives
by unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion right for unmarried as well as married
women), were litigated by feminists and their legal allies. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (2d ed. 1998); KRISTIN
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion).
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-53. See also id. at 926-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)
(containing stronger statement of the Court's pre-1989 abortion jurisprudence).
58. Id. at 850-53.
59. Id. at 870-76.
60. See id. at 888-98.
61. Laurence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (following Casey to protect the right of gay people to engage in
consensual private relations, notwithstanding the moral objections from some quarters; noting that the
holding did not extend to sexual activities that were not consensual or that were public).
1348 5 7 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1333 (20 10)
HeinOnline  -- 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1348 2009-2010
however, entail any kind of moral approval from the Court. Moral distance from
the conduct the majority justices were constitutionally protecting saturates both
Casey and Lawrence.62
B. Antidiscrimination: Suspect Classifications and Beyond
In 1961, hundreds of state-sanctioned discriminatory practices targeted
adult citizens because of their (female) sex, (nonconforming) gender, or
(homo)sexual activities. Following the civil rights model, feminists and sexual
minorities sought repeal or invalidation of these practices and the adoption of
affirmative state policies barring discrimination by private employers, schools,
and public accommodations.6 ' Their arguments reflected a shift toward a more
aggressive interpretation of the liberal model embodied in criminal law reform:
Sexual or gender variation is not merely tolerable, but benign. This normative
point also drew inspiration from the civil rights movement, which successfully
maintained that racial variation ought to be considered completely benign as a
matter of public policy and constitutional doctrine.'
Feminists have been particularly successful in invalidating sex discrimina-
tion and securing laws barring sex discrimination in the workplace, educational
settings, and public accommodations." The Supreme Court came within one
vote of ruling that sex-based classifications, like race-based classifications,
require strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.66 Subsequent decisions
have usually struck down sex-based classifications that discriminate against
women. In the workplace and other arenas, sex variation is legally benign and
cannot be the basis for discrimination.
Gay people have also successfully advanced the liberal norm of benign
variation: The federal government and a large majority of states bar sexual
62. See Marc Spindelman, Surwviing Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615,1619-32 (2004) (examin-
ing Lawrence's intense effort to reaffirm heterosexuality and the opinion's treatment of homosexuality
with tolerance but not equal respect).
63. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 2124-38, 2169-75, 2188-92 (discussing the shift in feminist and
gay legal reform efforts after early success in getting the police off their backs).
64. See id. at 2082-96 (tracing the shift in the civil rights movement toward an equality agenda
after some success in securing process protections against terrorizing criminal prosecutions).
65. Part of this success can be attributed to the majority women enjoy in the voting electorate. See
BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND
THEORY (2d ed. 1996) (providing a history of feminists' successful efforts to repeal or invalidate almost all
open government discriminations against women on the basis of sex).
66. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (majority ruling that sex is a quasi-suspect classification
receiving intermediate scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion
finding that sex-based distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (strong version of intermediate
scrutiny for sex-based classifications).
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orientation discrimination in government employment; nearly half the states and
more than one hundred municipalities bar such discrimination by private
employers, and almost as many states and cities bar such discrimination in public
accommodations and/or educational institutions. 6 A dozen states and a number
of municipalities have extended their antidiscrimination rules to include gender
identity or orientation as a presumptively irrational basis for employment
decisions. 9
As was the case with decriminalization campaigns, public opposition to
antidiscrimination rules has increasingly argued within the liberal model, at the
expense of the natural law model (which many Americans still privately embrace
as a matter of religious faith). Support for rules openly discriminating against
women because of sex has virtually disappeared. Supporters of rules discrimi-
nating against sexual and gender minorities have largely abandoned the old
arguments that "homosexuals" or transgendered persons are immoral, mentally
defective, or unnatural, and argue instead that such minorities disrupt the
workplace or other public spaces.7" The most interesting and ascendant argu-
ment is completely liberal, both philosophically and constitutionally: Equal
protection for sexual and gender minorities can be harmful because it abridges
the liberties of religious minorities-namely, fundamentalists who adhere to the
natural law model largely rejected by modem legal culture."
The sex and sexual orientation discrimination cases have transformed the
Constitution. The Supreme Court's equal protection activism in the race cases
could be justified by the representation-reinforcement argument that local
(southern) political processes were stacked against people of color. The Court's
highly activist constitutional sex discrimination decisions did not enjoy that
justification; indeed, most were handed down at precisely the same time the
country was debating the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which had passed
Congress by overwhelming margins and ultimately fell just short of ratification by
68. See Lambda Legal, supra note 43, for a state-by-state survey of sexual orientation antidiscrimi-
nation rules.
69. See id.
70. See Eskridge, supra note 46, at 1328-29.
71. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS
(Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (collection of essays exploring the increasing conflict between equality
for gay people and liberty for some religious people); Andy Koppelman & George Dent, Must Gay
Rights Conflict with Religious Identity? (Dec. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with UCLA
Law Review). An early version of this argument is ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY:
THE SURvIvAL OF OR NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY
13-28 (1977).
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three-quarters of the state legislatures.72 The Court primarily justified its sex
discrimination jurisprudence on the substantive judgment that sex ordinarily
constitutes an irrational basis for state discrimination-an acceptance of the
norm of benign sex variation. Note how remarkable this activism was: A pur-
portedly strict constructionist Court embraced a highly dynamic interpretation
of the Constitution in the face of We the People's failure to amend the
Constitution, and without the democracy-perfecting features that justified
aggressive judicial review in the race cases.
In the future, wider acceptance of the liberal norm of benign gender and
sexual variation will probably spur the Court to extend the same consideration
to sexual orientation and gender identity classifications. The process is already
afoot. In 1992, Colorado voters passed Amendment 2, which preempted
local and state antidiscrimination protections for sexual minorities, based largely
upon arguments that such laws provided "homosexuals" with "special rights" that
deprived traditionalist Coloradans of their liberties.73 Gay rights advocates
challenged Amendment 2 on the ground that it reflected antigay prejudice and
not a genuine public interest. Defenders responded that the liberal interest in
protecting religious liberty justified preempting gay rights ordinances.74 Rejecting
that argument, but only implicitly, the Supreme Court ruled in Romer v.
Evans" that Amendment 2 lacked a persuasive public justification and was
apparently motivated by "animus" against gay people. Romer provided the
normative background for the Court's subsequent disposition in Lawrence
(supported by the same six justices): Sexual variation is at least tolerable, and
the era when a state could demonize lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as enemies
of the people has closed.
Since Romer and Lawrence, the public law agenda of the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgendered, and intersex (LGBTI) rights movement has been to
persuade Americans that sexual and gender variation is not just tolerable but
benign, and that the state should not promote traditional gender roles or
heterosexuality as standards suitable for all Americans. LGBTI advocates pri-
marily pursue that norm through laws prohibiting private as well as public
72. For an excellent update on the relationship among the ERA, feminism, and constitutional
doctrine, see Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of
Feminism, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1223 (2009).
73. The Amendment 2 ballot materials are reprinted in Robert Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 167, 191-99 (1997), and ESKRIDE & HUNTER, supra note 1, at app. 3, 1524-31.
74. See, e.g., Brief for Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008428.
75. 517 U.S. 620,631-32 (1996).
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employers from discriminating because of sexual orientation or gender identity. 6
State supreme courts have been increasingly receptive, with some finding
sexual orientation discrimination either quasi-suspect (like sex) or suspect (like
race).7 The underlying logic posits that sexual variation is presumptively benign
with regard to public-regarding goals and projects, and therefore subjects laws
deploying such classifications to a more searching review and presumptive
invalidation.78 Judges in these cases have rejected representation-reinforcing
arguments that would leave gay rights claims to the political process. 9 I predict
that upon the formation of a rough state court consensus that sexual variation
is benign, the Supreme Court will reach the same conclusion and disable the
state from insisting on heterosexuality.
C. Family and Marriage
The recent state cases finding sexual orientation to be a (quasi) suspect
classification all involved state constitutional challenges to state same-sex
marriage bars.8 The marriage exclusion will be the last major state sexual orien-
tation discrimination-and one of the last sex discriminations-to be revoked.8'
From a liberal perspective, marriage as one man, one woman is the ultimate
testing ground for full public acceptance that variations in sex, gender, and
sexuality are all benign and not just tolerable.
As a formal matter, state refusals to recognize same-sex marriage function as
discrimination because of sex: If the state would give a marriage license to Lucy
and Ricky, but not Lucy and Ethel, the classification that triggers the dis-
crimination is Lucy's sex, for if she were a man she would get the license to
76. The 2009-2010 version of the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act prohibits both
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by private as well as public employers. Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009). For state laws barring job dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity, see Lambda Legal, supra note 43.
77. See e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441-42 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Conn. Dep't
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 461 (Conn. 2008); Vamrnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). See
also Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,499-500 (Ky. 1992) (dictum).
78. E.g., Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450-54; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431-61; Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 889-96.
79. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 439-61; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893-96.
80. See cases cited supra note 77.
81. In contrast to Europe, American courts have already moved from the assumption of malignant
to tolerable variation in child custody cases. Compare Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 898-900 (1979) (discussing
the earlier cases, where homosexuality was considered presumptively disqualifying in child custody), with
Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (representing the leading case for the modem view
that homosexuality cannot be considered unless there is a showing of harm to the child).
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marry Ethel." As a functional matter, same-sex marriage denial reflects tradi-
tional gender roles, in which a woman is assumed to "need" a man in order to
achieve domestic bliss in holy matrimony. In practice, the marriage ban dis-
criminates against lesbian and gay couples, making it the nation's most
important sexual orientation discrimination. Finally, the ban perpetuates gender
identity discrimination, as in the case of couples denied marriage licenses
because the state finds a transgendered person's "sex" disrupts the one man, one
woman requirement."
Although five states and the District of Columbia now celebrate same-sex
marriages, and two others (New York and Maryland) will recognize out-of-state
same-sex marriages," this is an idea whose time has not yet come in America.
As with antidiscrimination laws, opponents and skeptics of same-sex marriage
have deemphasized natural law arguments in favor of liberal ones. Although
many Americans might oppose such unions because they find "homosexuality"
or gender bending immoral or disgusting, their public justifications have become
increasingly liberal. Thus, the primary public arguments against same-sex
marriage claim that it would undermine "traditional marriage" for everyone
else or would harm children, who assertedly need to be raised by a father-mother
couple and taught that one man, one woman marriage is the best way to organize
a family.85 These arguments have had traction in liberal as well as conservative
jurisdictions; marriage equality has lost important votes in California, New
86Jersey, and New York in recent years.
Acceptance of the more progressive liberal norm is by no means universal
in America. Table 1, below, provides an overview of the progression of public
attitudes regarding sexual and gender variation, the legal regimes each stage
entails, and the politics of the progression. One can look at the legal regime in
place to make inferences about public attitudes toward sexual variation.
82. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197,208 (1994).
83. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999) (denying marriage recognition to a
male-to-female transsexual and a man).
84. See Opinion of the Maryland Attorney General, Feb. 10, 2010, http:/lgbtbar.org/newsletter/
2010/MDOAGOpiniononSame-SexMarriage.pdf (surveying states that authorize same-sex marriages or
recognize out-of-state marriages of this kind).
85. WILLIAM N. ESKRIEXE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE? 37-41 (2006) (tracing the dramatic evolution of arguments against same-sex marriage).
86. See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009) (upholding Proposition 8, a popular
constitutional initiative that revoked same-sex marriage recognition). In 2009, voters revoked same-sex
marriage in Maine, and legislative chambers rejected same-sex marriage bills in gay-friendly New York
and New Jersey.
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Table 1. Post-1961 American Debate about Sexual & Gender Variation
Sexual & Gender Legal Regime Politics
Variation
Criminalization of sexual- Politics of the Closet
or gender-deviant
activities Moralist politicians scapegoat
Variation Malignant sexual and gender minorities,
(Traditional Norm Pervasive discrimination blame them for social ills
under Attack after against sexual and gender
1961) minorities Minorities powerless because
they are closeted and objects
Demonization of sexual or of prejudice
gender minorities
Civil Rights Politics
Sexual minorities mobilize in
oermntn ocities and gain professional
decriminalization of ale
sexual- and gender-
deviant activities that do Militant traditionalists
Variation Tolerable not harm third parties redemonize sexual and gender
(Liberal Norm) mnrte
State revocation of official minorities
discriminations against Legislators willing to adopt
sexual and gender policies of tolerance; judges
minorities willing to reverse the burden
of inertia against outlier
policies
Normal Politics
New hate crimes Sexual and gender minorities
Antidiscrimination laws, attract more mainstream
including private allies
Variation Benign employers, Legislators and judges see
(Stronger Liberal Norm) accommodations, schools LGBTI persons' grievances as
Domestic partnerships, plausible civil rights claims
civil unions or marriage Traditionalists retreat on
for LGBTI persons many issues, draw the final
line at gay marriage
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Thus, in most of New England, where state policy treats gay people exactly the
same as straight people, we can assume that these states have moved toward the
liberal model where homosexuality is generally considered a benign
variation. Conversely, in most states of the Baptist South and Mormon West,
where discriminatory practices and laws remain in place, attitudes have moved
only a little from the natural law model.' Most of the country has acquiesced
in the liberal notion of tolerable sexual and gender variation (backed up by
Supreme Court opinions) but does not consider such variation entirely benign.
This gap represents the primary normative political battle in the new
millennium, but as Part III suggests, some activists and academics have already
moved to a new front, one beyond the liberal model.
1II. POST-LIBERAL MODEL: PRODUCTIVE SEXUAL AND GENDER
VARIATION AND DANGERS OF NORMALIZATION
The last generation of American policymakers has seen important
challenges to the liberal model of tolerable or benign sexual and gender varia-
tion. To some extent, the liberal model has been a victim of its own success.
Like the civil rights movement, the social movements seeking equal rights for
women and LGBTI people have splintered as they have attracted more openly
radical feminists and LGBTI people to their normative campaign and as the legal
discriminations have diminished. Nothing helps keep a social movement coher-
ent and focused so much as open legal discriminations founded on demeaning
claims about its members. Once those obvious discriminations fall away, the
sense of shared threat dissipates and the group's agenda becomes a matter for
debate. In the LGBTI community, this debate takes place across a larger and less
homogenous constituency than in the pioneering days of the movement.
As a general rule, once an identity-based social movement persuades society
and the polity to recognize its liberal claims, preexisting divisions between
assimilationists (who are relatively happy with formal equality) and radicals (who
believe that the movement should transform the status quo beyond its original
aspirations) become much more prominent.89 This divide certainly exists
within the feminist and LGBTI rights movements. Many women, gay men,
and lesbians have been pleasantly surprised by the achievements of their
87. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 85, at 242-44 tbl.6.1 & fig.6.1 (state-by-state
evaluations).
88. See id.
89. Cf. Gary Pellet, Race Conscousns, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758 (closely analyzing the debate between
integrationists and nationalists within the civil rights movement in the 1960s).
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movements.9 But other women and gays, as well as many transgendered and
intersexual persons, have felt left behind. The success of their shared social
movement creates discursive space to conceptualize this disappointment and
press the movement in more radical or transformative directions. Consider
three examples, representing radical feminism, queer theory, and trans theory.
Catharine MacKinnon argues that the liberal model is deeply misguided
because it misses the source of women's subordination and violent oppression:
Formal sex-based discriminations and informal gender attitudes are the conse-
quence of an aggressive male-oriented understanding of heterosexuality itself.9'
"Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them,
by the social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual
dominance and female sexual submission."92 Her distillation: Man fucks woman:
Subject verb object. This is the theoretical underpinning of MacKinnon's
campaigns against sexual harassment in the workplace and misogynist pornog-
raphy.93 Critics worry that MacKinnon overdemonizes sexuality and overstates
its relationship to sex discrimination and gender subordination.94
A very different conceptualization is found in the work of Michel Foucault,
who has inspired a great deal of radical queer theory. Foucault claimed that
sexuality is a social production and that the law's hysterical focus on women's
bodies, children's developing urges, and the erotic practices of persons at soci-
ety's margins produced rather than suppressed intense feelings and orientations
that modem society now calls "sexuality."'95 In his critique of freedom from state
regulation as liberation, Foucault articulated the notion that while the mecha-
nisms may differ, liberal societies can be just as coercive as repressive societies. A
repressive society coerces through legal rules, whereas a liberal society coerces
90. Many women, however, have been dismayed by the feminist movement. See, e.g., KATIE
ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993). Many of these women
have opposed the feminist movement's pro-choice and equality "reforms." See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 54,
at 158-91 (pro-life women); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 98-117 (1986) (anti-
ERA women).
91. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAw (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism].
92. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, supra note 91, at 533.
93. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 91, at 103-16 (sexual harassment); id. at
163-97 (misogynist porn).
94. For the classic response, see Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole Vance ed., 1984).
95. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1103-06 (Robert Hurley
trans., Pantheon books 1985) (1984). On the social constructionist theory of Foucault, see FORMS OF
DESIRE SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed.,
1990) (reprinting essays by McIntosh, Foucault, and critics of the theory).
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through normalization, the reporting and obsession about what is normal.96
While the liberal model may free sexual and gender minorities from constraining
natural law rules, it can at the same time restrict those minorities by creating
standardized behaviors. Critics of Foucault note that his powerful theories about
the social construction of sexuality and about normalization slight the important
role that gender plays.97
Finally, consider Judith Butler, who has rearticulated Foucault's theory in
light of the experience of women and transgendered people. Butler argues that
gender is both a social product and a social cause. Specifically, rigid categoriza-
tion by gender renders modem sex binariness coherent and intelligible, and
gender coherence stands both as a product and source of compulsory
heterosexuality.98 From such premises, Katherine Franke maintains that liberal
ACLU feminism made a central mistake in disaggregating sex from gender: Like
gender, sex is a social production and not a matter of simple biology.99 Dean
Spade has deepened Butler's project by demonstrating how the elemental
bureaucracy of state-building (census taking, license issuing, social safety netting)
creates an oppressive coherence for sex that crushes transgendered persons."0
Three central ideas unite these disparate thinkers (as well as many others),
and these commonalities create intellectual excitement and political possibilities
in the field of sexuality, gender, and the law. First, as a descriptive matter,
the liberal model errs in disaggregating sex, gender, and sexuality. Although the
liberal critique of the natural law model is correct and necessary, the conse-
quence of such a critique ought not to be a regime where sex is confined to the
realm of biology, gender to the realm of culture, and sexuality to something
of both. Instead of disaggregated and independent as in the liberal model
(Figure 2), sex, gender, and sexuality are interdependent social productions or
"performances" as diagrammed in Figure 3 below.
96. On normalization, see GEORGES CANGUILHEM, THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL
(Carolyn R. Fawcett trans., 1989) (1966); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 182-84 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
97. E.g., VIKKI BELL, INTERROGATING INCEST: FEMINISM, FOUCAULT, AND THE LAW (1993).
98. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 22-
25 (2d ed. 1999), drawing from Adrienne Rich. For a more recent articulation of her theory, see also
JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004) [hereinafter BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER].
99. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
100. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS LJ. 731 (2008).
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Figure 3. The Post-Liberal Model of Sex,
Gender, and Sexuality
Second, post-liberal thinkers make an important normative point: Sexual
and gender variation is not just benign, but critically productive.' Minority
sexual or gender performances have a lot to teach mainstream society. Particu-
larly useful is Erving Goffiman's notion of "microperformances," or the power we
have when we present ourselves in everyday interactions. 2 Just as our social
context impacts upon our identities and feelings of worth, the identities we
project-and the pride we suggest-have ripple effects in the world. Consider
some examples.
101. 1 recognize that the notion of productive sexual and gender variation can easily be understood
in liberal terms, but the legal thinkers espousing this kind of idea have more in common with antiliberal
philosophers such as Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
77 CALL. REV. 521 (1989), than with liberal philosophers such as John Rawls.
102. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, at xi (1959); see Marc
Poirier, Micwperfonrances o Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH.
& LEEJ. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 3 (2008).
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Traditionalists argue that the presence of women or gay people or
transsexuals in the workplace (or the military) is "disruptive" and therefore
undermines the cohesion and purposiveness of the enterprise." Liberals respond
that sex, gender, or sexuality differences are benign and have no relationship to
the employee's merit; any disruption exists in the small minds of unenlightened
persons who need to transcend their prejudices or stereotypical thinking. Post-
liberals agree that these differences are benign but insist that they are also
potentially productive and transformative, precisely because microperformances
by gender benders and sexual minorities in the workplace do indeed "disrupt"
traditionalist attitudes about sex, gender, and sexuality. Thus, it is good and not
just tolerable or benign to have gay men and lesbians in the workplace, for their
open presence disrupts the notion that only heterosexual men who support
their dependent wives and children are good workers. It is good and not just
tolerable or benign to have transgendered employees, for their microperfor-
mances destabilize the notion that sex is a stable, biological category. 4 In my
view, the notion of productive variation ties together the feminist, gay-lesbian,
trans, and intersexual rights movements. They share an understanding of sex,
gender, and sexuality as interconnected, and deploy once-marginalized traits
as focal points to reconstruct traditional institutions such as the family, the
workplace, and the state.
Finally, the post-liberal thinkers question the notion that the liberal state
can be neutral. A state that does not openly discriminate because of people's sex,
gender, or sexual orientation can just as powerfully harm them by ignoring
private violence against women and sexual/gender minorities or by contributing
to pervasive normalizing discourse that marginalizes women and minorities. As
Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West (among others) argue, many construc-
tions of sexuality and gender can be harmful if they prevent women and public
institutions from deliberating openly about productive performances.'05
103. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(4)-(15) (2006) (stating that persons engaging in "homosexual
conduct" must be excluded from the armed forces because they would undermine the "cohesion" needed
for effective deployment).
104. Cf. BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 98, at 29-30 (describing how the presence of
transgendered individuals destabilizes the political field); see also MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS:
CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY (1997) (arguing that the presence of the cross-dresser
destabilizes the situation, often in productive ways); MARJORIE GARBER, BISEXUALITY AND THE
EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE (2000) (making a similar argument about the presence of the bisexual).
105. CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 91, at 163-97 (implementing an engaged politics of sexual-gender
critique of misogynistic porn); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (arguing that feminists
ought to engage in consciousness-raising conversations to decide what kinds of sexual expression and
gender roles are satisfying to women themselves).
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I combine all these ideas into the umbrella concept of productive sexual and
gender variation. Consider how this concept and the dynamics of the post-liberal
model shed light on the progressive agenda for public law. On the one hand,
considering sexual and gender variation productive rather than just benign opens
up critical discourse about the problems with the natural law and other normaliz-
ing models: Not only can gay be good, but straight can be bad. We might call
this the critical feature of the productive variation norm. On the other hand,
the notion of productive variation requires positive thinking as well: What
messages should we be sending the nation's youth? What relationship forms
work best for family needs? These questions arising out of the constructive
feature of the productive variation norm cannot be answered without including
LGBTI people as well as feminists in these conversations.
A. Same-Sex Marriage: Denormalizing Heterosexuality, Traditional Gender
Roles, and Sex Binarism
Most post-liberals writing about same-sex marriage are highly critical of the
idea, because it normalizes an institution many radicals loathe and because social
movement resources can be better deployed toward other projects."6 But these
pointed criticisms are far from the only insights suggested by post-liberal theory.
Indeed, an excellent social constructionist case exists for same-sex marriage.
The most obvious normalization in the same-sex marriage debate is not
married>unmarried, but heterosexual>homosexual.' °7 According to opponents,
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men are weird, and recognizing their marriages
would be really weird. Much of the population resists same-sex marriage because
of homophobia, which of course harms all gay people. By admitting gay people
into a fundamental mainstream institution, same-sex marriage would contribute
to the denormalization of heterosexuality, the denormalization of traditional
gender roles, and perhaps even the undermining of sex binarism itself.
Thus, as Nan Hunter says, same-sex marriage "could also destabilize the
cultural meaning of marriage. It would create for the first time the possibility
of marriage as a relationship between members of the same social-status
106. 1 take these points and urge the gentle reader to study the following texts, which are excellent
examples of the critical features of post-liberal theory: Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Daiande the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9.
107. See CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND THE POLITICS OF THE CLOSET:
LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACENT 107-15, 121-31 (2000).
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categories."1°8 As traditionalists insist, same-sex marriage would be a dramatic
shift in the way western culture thinks about marriage and gender roles.
Through daily microperformances as well as the act of marrying, woman-woman
marriage refutes the gendered idea that "wives" do not work outside the home. If
one man, one woman marriage normalizes sex binarism, traditional gender roles,
and compulsory heterosexuality, gay and lesbian marriage cannot help but
disrupt this cultural linkage. Indeed, as Mae Kuykendall has argued, the strong
cultural resistance to same-sex marriage is founded upon people's deep cognitive
attachment to sex binarism'0-a point that makes the marriage debate sig-
nificant from a radical as well as assimilationist point of view.
Additionally, there is emerging evidence that less-gendered households
manage conflicts differently, and in some ways more productively, than more-
gendered married households. Dr. John Gottman and Robert Levenson's
twelve-year (1987-99) study comparing a sample of forty straight, twenty gay,
and twenty lesbian couples found that the lesbian and gay couples negotiated
differences differently than the straight couples. ' The researchers concluded
that the same-sex couples handled conflict more congenially and with greater
affection than the different-sex couples. The authors speculate that one reason
for the more fluid process of conflict resolution is that gay and lesbian couples
are less burdened by gender anxieties about power disparity. Although the
conclusions of this study are highly provisional given the small and nonrandom
samples, they do suggest a good reason why the state ought to give some value to
relationships that systematically deny traditional gender roles.
Moreover, the gender-role argument does not depend upon the possi-
bility that same-sex couples will actually abandon the traditional division of
labor between breadwinner and housekeeper within marriage. In a woman-
woman marriage where tasks are divided up along traditional lines, a woman will
be doing the accustomed male role of working outside the home. In a man-man
marriage where tasks are divided up along traditional lines, a man will be doing
the accustomed female role of keeping house. This symbolism represents the
108. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9,17
(1991); see also LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL
CULTURE 104-06 (1995) (making this argument in the context of the authors' general theorizing about
the productive role of sexual dissent in our political culture).
109. See Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story About Language: Linguistic
Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (1999).
110. John M. Gottman et al., Observing Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual Couples' Relationships:
Mathematical Modeling of Conflict Interaction, 45 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 65, 73-74 (2003). Dr. Gottman and
his colleagues have continued their in-depth study of lesbian and gay partnerships; some recent findings are
reported on the Gottman Institute's website. GOTTMAN INST., THE 12-YEAR STUDY, http://
www.gottman.com/SubPage.aspx?spdtid=2&sp_id=100842&sptid= 1 (last visited June 1, 2010).
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deeper challenge to traditional gender roles. In the argot of normalization, when
female-female and male-male couples can marry, the wife-housekeeper/husband-
breadwinner model for the family becomes less normal, and possibly even
abnormal, over time.
Gender is as gender does. Under the view of gender as pefformative, the
display of two women married to one another carries significance. Every day and
in public view at least one of the women performs in ways that do not fit with
women's traditional roles. A married woman who derives independent satisfac-
tion from her job outside the home becomes more normal.11"' Not only does the
ceremony where two women are joined in matrimony function as a powerful
bit of choreography, but the day-by-day performances of two women managing a
family destabilize rigid gender roles. And if gender serves as the linchpin of
compulsory heterosexuality, its destabilization ought to discredit antigay and
perhaps also antiqueer attitudes and regulations.
The destabilization can even occur without any legal action, once same-sex
marriage becomes part of public discourse. LGBTI people have been given
opportunities to be heard and seen in ways not possible before the same-sex
marriage debate hit the western world. In an essay exploiting the way that
microperformances can be radical, Mary Coombs reminds us that transgendered
people have acted as pioneers and activists in favor of same-sex marriage."'
Many male-to-female transsexuals have been married to women before and after
their sex-change therapies and operations. Their marriages force the state to
grapple with the question of whether their legal sex, gender, or sexual orientation
has changed as well. If the state insists on their heterosexuality and that their
marriages are not same-sex,13 the legal system has already yielded a wonderful
pastiche of gender: A woman marries a person with female sex organs, female
hormones, female attire, but whose male chromosomes enable the state to
pretend that she fills the male sex role so that the marriage can still be considered
different-sex. Pastiches like this one not only expose the arbitrariness of denying
same-sex couples marriage licenses, but also the arbitrariness of sex and gender as
rigid regulatory categories.
From a doctrinal point of view, the post-liberal perspective asserting the
interdependence of sex, gender, and sexuality provides intellectual grounding for
111. On the intrinsic value of work outside the home for women generally and wives in particular,
see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
112. See Mary 1. Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1998). See also Martha Ertman, Reconsructing Marriage: An InterSEXional
Approach, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1215 (1998) (exploring ways that committed relationships involving
intersexuals also destabilize sex binarism).
113. Courts in England and the United States have generally found that transsexual marriages are
not same-sex. See Coombs, supra note 112, at 244-57 (discussing the cases).
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the famous sex discrimination argument for gay rights."4 After finding that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification and that gay people have a
fundamental right to marry, the California Supreme Court in the Marriage Cases
followed other courts in rejecting the sex discrimination argument."' But if femi-
nists and gender theorists like Adrienne Rich and Catharine MacKinnon are
right-that compulsory heterosexuality is an important dimension of sexism and
violence against women" 6 -the court's insistence on keeping the categories
separate itself constitutes a deeply problematic move. By ignoring the sex dis-
crimination inherent in the definition of marriage as exclusively for one man,
one woman, the court fails to transform the institution into a truly welcome
place for same-sex couples.
Finally, the same-sex marriage debate offers political opportunities for
radicals. Even in tolerant, relatively gay-friendly jurisdictions such as those of the
Northeast, there has been intense opposition to gay marriage. Under such cir-
cumstances, legislatures and often courts seek room for compromise. That
phenomenon has generated new institutions, including domestic partnerships,
civil unions, and reciprocal beneficiaries-just to list the names used in the
United States. In Canada and Europe, and more slowly in the United States,
straight as well as gay or queer couples can choose from an emerging menu of
options (including marriage) for state recognition of their relationships."7 The
regulatory monopoly civil marriage once enjoyed in western civilization has
ended. If radicals believe that marriage should be junked, the same-sex marriage
debate has provided them a perfect opportunity to invent new institutions that
better meet the needs of our population.
B. Schools: Programs Against Prejudice and Stereotypes
The previous Subpart redresses an imbalance in the post-liberal literature
concerning the marriage issue: Academic writing against same-sex marriage from
an antinormalizing point of view is rich and useful, but needs to be supplemented
with antinormalizing arguments for same-sex marriage. In this Subpart, I cor-
rect a different kind of imbalance found in the academic treatment of sex,
114. See Koppelman, supra note 82. On homophobia as a key instrument of sexism, see Adrienne
Rich, CompuLsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SiGNS 631 (1980), reprinted in ADRIENNE RICH,
BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE, 1979-1985, at 23 (1986), as well as SUZANNE
PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988) and Claudia Card, Why Homophobia?, 5 HYPATIA
110(1990).
115. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436-39 (Cal. 2008); accord, Edward Stein, Evaluating the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471,496-505 (2001).
116. Rich, supra note 114; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, supra note 91.
117. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 85, at 7.
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gender, and sexuality issues in educational settings. The obvious agenda sug-
gested by the post-liberal model's concept of productive sexual and gender
variation asserts that schools have an affirmative duty not only to protect gen-
der and sexual minority students from violence and harassment (the standard
liberal agenda), but also to produce an environment where they are welcomed
and where their micropefformances are appreciated. The notion is not just that
minority students deserve such dignified treatment (they do), but also that the
engagement of gender and sexual minorities within the school is deeply educa-
tional for all concerned. By interacting with students, teachers, and staff
members who are themselves openly lesbian or gay, bisexual, transgendered or
intersexual, students will gain an appreciation that sex, gender, and sexuality can
be presented in many ways."'
Consider a concrete example illustrating the connection and contrast
between liberal and post-liberal norms about sexual and gender variation.
Massachusetts has implemented the liberal agenda: State law not only bars
employers, schools, and public accommodations from discriminating against gay
persons, but gives full recognition to same-sex marriage and lesbian/gay fami-
lies. Consistent with the benign variation norm, state education policy requires
public schools to address the "detrimental effect of prejudice [including
homophobia] on individual relationships and on society as a whole."'"9 Some
schools in the state have taken this liberal idea somewhat further-to celebrate
the productivity of sexual and gender diversity, and in ways that challenge tra-
ditional understandings of marriage and gender roles in American society. Thus,
schools have introduced first-grade students to books like Molly's Family, which
depicts a girl who is teased for having two mothers; the lesson of the book is that
such teasing results from ignorance, for families come in many varieties.
Some traditionalist parents objected that the state should remain neutral
in the debate about the normative superiority of traditional marriage, and they
sought notice of such instruction and the right to withdraw their children from
it. Their stance is plausibly liberal: Even if the state chooses to treat gay marriage
the same as traditional marriage (the benign variation idea), the state should not
impose that norm upon the impressionable children of parent's whose religion
counsels them otherwise. The state responded that reading books like Molly's
Family teaches students important lessons about lesbian families. Liberals might
118. For excellent literature along these lines, see, for example, Shannon Gilreath, "Tell Your Faggot
Friend He Owes Me $500 for My Broken Hand": Thoughts on a Substantive Equaity Theory of Free Speech,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557 (2009).
119. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing Massachusetts's state rules for
health curriculum studies in grades 6-8). See also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51500 (West 2006 & Supp.
2010) (barring schools from instruction that contributes to antigay bias).
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agree with the parents' desire to supervise their children's normative education,
but might also support the school on the ground that true neutrality would have
to admit the possibility of two mothers. And so the purely liberal model fails to
resolve the conflict.
Post-liberal theory would question whether there is any "neutral" policy the
school can follow: If the school requires the students to read Molly's Family, it not
only normalizes lesbian parents, but also lesbian marriage, homosexuality, and
nongendeted roles within the family. If the school only requires the students to
read stories about traditional families, it not only normalizes traditional marriage,
but also heterosexuality and (probably) gendered roles within the family.
Whatever the school does, it endorses a particular relationship among sex, sexu-
ality, and gender-and so its policy must be defended, ultimately, on the ground
that the "coercive" normalizing regime is a good one.
This is a debate traditionalists are willing to engage in, and one that
progressives cannot avoid. Another situs of the debate has been the famous "T-
Shirt Wars." In Harper v. Poway Unified School District,2' a California school
with a history of antigay violence adopted a Day of Silence that celebrated sexual
and gender diversity within the school."' Protesting the event, student Matt
Harper wore a T-shirt citing Romans 1:27, to indicate that homosexuality is
shameful, and was disciplined by the school. The school's position can be
defended and criticized on both liberal and post-liberal grounds. Liberal theory
could defend the school's program as necessary to create a safe space for lesbian
and gay students and staff. But it also might criticize the discipline of Harper for
repressing his statement of his own diversity as a traditionalist student who did
not agree with the benign variation norm. Post-liberal theory could defend the
student's dissent as resistance to normalization of a bland tolerance. At the same
time, post-liberals might support the school's belief in the importance of
demonstrating to students that sexual and gender diversity is a good thing, and
in need of nourishment against the antigay violence that can be found in
California's history and in the school's own hallways.
Notice here the potential conceptual mobility of the traditional family val-
ues position, which can easily be expressed in the language of either the liberal
or even the post-liberal model. Traditional family values advocates have already
turned to liberal "rights" arguments (privacy and freedom of speech), and in the
future they will likely adopt post-liberal antinormalizing arguments (freedoms of
120. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
121. Id. (allowing the school to discipline a student who wore a Romans 1:27 T-shirt insisting
that homosexuality is shameful). Cf. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d
668 (7th Cir. 2008) (allowing the school wide leeway but barring it from disciplining a student whose
T-shirt was a milder and wittier "Be Happy, Not Gay" message).
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speech, association, and religion) to resist the state's implementation of the
concept that sexual and gender variation are either benign or productive. In
the process of making these liberal or post-liberal arguments, "traditional" family
values conservatives will continue the process of transforming (and perhaps
destroying) the natural law model.
C. Workplace: Accommodation of Difference
A post-liberal perspective also brings a new focus to sexuality, gender, and
the workplace. The liberal model lends ambiguous support to general antidis-
crimination laws, because such laws function as state intrusions into private
workplaces and exercise potentially strong coercive force upon traditionalist
employers and coworkers. ' Post-liberal theory adds that whatever power legal
enforcement might have, the power of normalization is even greater. Tradi-
tionalists, therefore, make a logical point when they complain of losing their
liberties under antidiscrimination laws. Such loss of liberty can be justified,
however, by the argument that it is an important public policy for the state to
construct a workplace that does not reflect the oppressive gender roles and sexual
repression of the past. In constructing such a workplace, the state needs to think
holistically: The demography of the workplace (especially the number of women
in positions of authority), the correlation between gendered roles and particular
sexes, and dating or sexual practices all work together to create a particular kind
of workplace.
What would an ideal post-liberal workplace look like? Progressive authors
are in greatest agreement that women, gay people, and transgendered persons
ought to be well-represented in the higher-order jobs and among positions of
employment authority. This workplace demography would not only create
new and arguably better understandings about sex roles and gender, but would
create better conditions for the meaningful exercise of choice. As Vicki Schultz
has explained, both traditionalists and liberals assume that women "choose"
lower-paying jobs based upon their own different natures (traditionalists) or
social conditions (liberals). '23 Both sides therefore miss the ways in which
women's gendered choices are channeled by gendered employment policies and
122. See ANDREW SULuVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL (1996) (arguing from a liberal perspective
that gay rights should focus on ending state discrimination, including same-sex marriage bars, but should
not follow the civil rights model of general antidiscrimination laws). Cf. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing company censorship of an employee's display of Leviticus
20:13 in reaction to its gay-friendly signs).
123. Vicki Schultz, Teling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in
the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
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by sex-segregated functions within workplaces (including the near-monopoly
men have on positions of authority)."' Gendered workplaces also tend to be
relatively hostile to their LGBTI workers; the reported cases of antigay har-
assment reflect highly gendered workplaces where stereotypes about women as
well as gay people animate harassing behaviors." 5
A post-liberal approach suggests the need for restructuring of workplaces,
not just rules barring open discrimination. This was one of the many brilliant
contributions of MacKinnon's theory of sexual harassment: Women's subordina-
tion in the workplace would not be successfully transformed until its animating
ideology-the predatory construction of male sexuality-was confronted and
resisted at all levels. The law changed, and probably for the better, when the
EEOC and the federal courts responded to women's experience and demands
with guidelines that made illegal many sexualized mores that rendered
workplaces frustrating or toxic for women and minorities.'26 It is at the level
of workplace structure, however, that MacKinnon has been most cogently
critiqued. Schultz has demonstrated that employers have deployed sexual har-
assment rules as mechanisms to "sanitize" the workplace, often to the detriment
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and female employees (those who are
most likely to be viewed in sexual terms) and urges a focus on gendered har-
assment rather than sexuality per se. 2'
Noah Zatz has noticed another important feature of the federal sexual
harassment guidelines: the transformation of an antidiscrimination rule into a
mandate that employers accommodate workers' needs.' Rules that impose
responsibilities on employers to maintain a workplace not hostile to women
may require them to accommodate the needs of some female employees and to
create structures that protect against harassment before it occurs. Likewise, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act sometimes requires employers to accommodate
needs of pregnant workers.'29 Particularly important is the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), which requires employers to accommodate both
male and female employees who need family time.'30 As Joan Williams has
argued, the agenda of the FMLA is distinctively post-liberal: The state abandons
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(evaluating sexual harassment claims of a gay man who was feminized and abused by his male coworkers).
126. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in MACKNNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 91, at 103.
127. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2065-66 (2003).
128. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 209 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (2009).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
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any pretense of neutrality and seeks to transform the workplace not only to
accommodate the needs of mothers, but also of fathers. The ultimate agenda
is to transform the way fathers think about themselves, from the gendered
notion of fathers as primarily breadwinners and careerists to the more bal-
anced notion of both parents being caregivers as well as careerists. 3'
Along the lines discussed above, Table 2 summarizes the current conceptual
and policy debates. One premise of Table 2 is that the modernized version of the
natural law model retains considerable power. Although neo-natural law sup-
porters will not be able to resist the wave of support for decent treatment of most
sexual and gender minorities, they may be able to prevent dramatic transfor-
mation of American law regulating families, schools, and workplaces.
Table 2. Legal Regimes Associated with Current Normative Models
Models Family Law Schools Workplaces
Liberal Model Marriage equality + Nondiscrimination Nondiscrimination
(Benign lesbian/gay families Antiharassment Antiharassment
Variation) Tolerance Accommodation of
curriculum difference
Transformation of Gay is good, trans is Antiharassment rules
marriage, terrific curriculum should restructure
Post-Liberal ungendering marital workplaces
Model roles Support LGBTI(Productive students against Accommodation ofVaradtion) Menu of relationship bigots, but caution difference; family
options: diversity of against creating leave model
choices resistance discourses transforming gender
role attitudes
Marriage is the best Abstinence and Support a sanitized
regime for children marriage ought to workplace
Neo-Natural and parents be supported
Law Model Normalizing choice Curricular "reform" Accommodation of
(Malignant + menu = productive normalizes unnatural religious beliefs >
Variation) of marriage decline, gender/sexual roles + accommodating
broken homes, loss of loss of rights for gender/sexual
rights for parents parents minorities
131. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of 'FReD': Family Responsibilities
Discriminao and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Impli it Bias, 59 HASTINGS L). 1311 (2008).
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CONCLUSION:
A SEXUALIZED AND DEGENDERED CONSTITUTION
Most of the effect of feminist, gaylegal, and trans activist movements on
American public law has been actualized through municipal, state, and federal
statutes administered by sympathetic agencies. But the liberal and progressive
discourses flowing from these social movements have also profoundly
affected constitutional law doctrine. Specifically, the ongoing conversation
among liberal, traditionalist, and progressive lawyers has shaped the cutting
edge of constitutional rules assuring privacy, equal protection, and free speech
and association. Consider a brief account of how constitutional rights and
theory have themselves been affected by discourses of sexuality and gender.
The constitutional right to privacy was for most of our history closely tied to
traditional marriage and family life.'32 Feminist and gay attorneys have suc-
cessfully pressed the Court to liberalize the privacy right to include sexual choices
outside of marriage.' Because the privacy right has been situated in the Due
Process Clause, the newer cases represent a rethinking of what has histori-
cally been fundamental to American life. This is an important reimagining of
American public law.
Although traditionalists view the new privacy right as deeply offensive to
natural law baselines, their constitutionalism has given greater emphasis to its
positive agenda, modernized to rearticulate family values as parental privacy
rights and religious values as liberty and associational rights.' Post-liberal activ-
ists and thinkers, in turn, openly assert that the pro-choice reading of privacy is
not neutral, and is changing the American family and even the institution of
marriage-in some ways for the better.
Indeed, the jurisprudence of privacy has become one focal point for what
traditionalists and progressives consider a major reconceptualization of marriage
132. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (leading case recognizing a fundamental right to
marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a privacy right by married couples
to use contraceptives); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (leading privacy case, protecting core
privacy rights "to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of [one's] own conscience").
133. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (expanding the right to contraceptives
beyond the married couples protected in Grisuod), followed and expanded in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (recognizing a right to choose an abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (redefining
the privacy right as one available for a wide array of sexual choices), overruling and rejecting the
jurisprudence of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional right to engage in
"homosexual sodomy" because that is purportedly not connected to marriage and family life).
134. See supra notes 70-71, 74, 85.
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and family in the United States.'35 California's Marriage Cases represented the
first time an American appellate court had accepted the privacy-based right to
marry argument to support same-sex marriage. A post-liberal perspective on this
important decision would emphasize how revolutionary it was for the court to
deploy a privacy-based right to open up "traditional marriage" to long-excluded
lesbian and gay couples. Unlike liberals who run away from this consequence,
progressives celebrate it and urge the creation of alternative forms of rela-
tionship recognition.
1 6
The Equal Protection Clause has evolved just as dramatically as the unenu-
merated privacy right. Although originally targeting state laws discriminating
against African Americans, the Equal Protection Clause has acquired a new
bite in response to the demands of liberal social movement lawyers. Thus, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts provided intermediate scrutiny for sex-based
classifications37 and rational basis with bite for classifications based on sexual
orientation.' Traditionalists have resisted this discourse by insisting that equal
protection activism not be expanded beyond race and perhaps sex, 139 and by
refusing to recognize marriage exclusions and other restrictions as formal dis-
crimination.'4 The dialogue between liberal and traditionalist claims has yielded
a sliding scale for equal protection cases: Whether a state discrimination passes
muster depends on (1) how fishy the classification is, (2) how much harm the
excluded group suffers, and (3) the importance of the state justification for
the precise discrimination."'
135. Liberals defending same-sex marriage cling to the notion that the expansion of marriage would
be on the whole policy-neutral. I share that perspective, for I believe that same-sex marriage itself would
not have the major effects on American families that cohabitation, no-fault divorce, and nonenforce-
ment of adultery laws have had. (All of these major effects have been incurred by the polity for the
convenience of straight couples; virtually none of the Christians devoutly opposing same-sex marriage
today has lifted a finger to protect children harmed by no-fault divorce.)
136. E.g., ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER (2007) (noting that one effect of
the same-sex marriage movement has been to create new state institutions for structuring romantic
relationships and advocating a deemphasis on civil marriage in law and culture). Traditionalist opposition
to same-sex marriage has fueled the creation of new forms of family recognition, including domestic
partnership laws that are typically available to straight as well as gay couples. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE,
supra note 85.
137. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
138. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-84 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(summarizing the Court's prior cases to say that antihomosexual measures will receive a "more
searching" judicial scrutiny).
139. Hence, new traditionalist arguments that suspect classifications can only accrue to minority
groups whose trait is "immutable" (like race) and that are politically powerless (like people of color in
the apartheid-era South). E.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.2d 384, 466-67 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
140. E.g., id. at 465.
141. The sliding scale approach originated with civil rights leader Justice Thurgood Marshall, see
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (dissenting opinion), but has been pressed
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Moreover, post-liberal thinking has demonstrated the importance of root-
and-branch reform and not just purging regulatory codes of discriminatory
"classifications."'42 This line of thought has not appeared in formal equal protec-
tion doctrine (yet), but it did exercise an influence in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs.'43 Upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act as
applied to the states, the Supreme Court reasoned that antifamily employer poli-
cies tended to create workplaces that were gendered: Women were ghettoized
because supervisors assumed they, and not male employees, would have to be
accommodated for family reasons.
The back and forth on issues of sexuality, gender, and the law has expanded
the First Amendment's imperial reach in the modem polity. Liberals relied on
free speech and associational rights during the civil rights era, gay people have
benefited from its protection of "coming out" speech and association, 4 and
transgendered persons and women have invoked free expression values to escape
workplace or school dress codes. 4 Now that many states and cities have adopted
official antidiscrimination laws and policies, traditionalists are powerfully invok-
ing First Amendment values to carve out religion-based or family-protective
speech or association from equality rules.
An example of the new gay equality-religious liberty clash is Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez.'" The Hastings Law School's antidiscrimination policy
bars official student groups from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation
and other traits. The Christian Legal Society (CLS) excludes "unrepentant"
homosexuals, and the issue before the Supreme Court is whether Hastings (a
state actor) can refuse to recognize the CLS. The Society makes the liberal
argument that Hastings is forcing conformity upon it in violation of its consti-
tutional speech and associational liberties. Hastings's main response also is
by majority opinions in cases involving other kinds of discrimination. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001) (majority opinion balancing these factors in a sex discrimination case); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (concurring and dissenting opinions both taking a sliding
scale approach to the rights of persons with disabilities); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (discussing exclusion of gay couples from civil marriage).
142. E.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281
(1991) (noting that just challenging discriminatory classifications does women no good; the structures of
sexism must be challenged); Dean Spade, Trans Law Reform Strategies, Co-Optation, and the Potenial for
Tran4sfmative Change, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L REP. 288 (2009) (making a similar argument for transgender
rights advocates).
143. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
144. E.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. PT&T, 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
145. E.g., Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)
(finding violations of both free expression and antidiscrimination rules for school to deny transgendered
student the right to wear attire consistent with her gender).
146. No. 06-15956, 2009 WL 693391 (9th Cit. Mar. 17, 2009) (mem.), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W.
3635(U.S. Dec. 7,2009) (No. 08-1371).
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liberal-that equality requires it to create a school where all are welcomed on
an equal basis; hence, no school-recognized student group can exclude anyone
from its membership.
Both CLS and Hastings have powerful post-liberal arguments as well. CLS
can suggest that religious and viewpoint diversity is just as important for a
college or professional school as sexual and gender diversity, and by normalizing
student groups around the notion of open membership, Hastings is coercing
CLS and discouraging future groups that might push back against the PC (politi-
cally correct) agenda. Hastings can respond that an antigay agenda premised
upon homophobic readings of Scripture is similar to the race-segregationist
agenda premised upon racist readings of Scripture a generation ago; just as the
state refused to support racist religious views then, so it ought to reject
homophobic religious views today.'47 Similar controversies will continue to arise
and in response push the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence to evolve.
Table 3, below, summarizes some of the ways the trialogue among liberals,
neo-natural law traditionalists, and post-liberal progressives has enriched and
complicated the constitutional doctrines discussed above. Of course, the argu-
ments will not cycle indefinitely. Once there is movement toward a social
consensus, some of the arguments will end-but new issues will emerge, and the
trialogue will resume its transformative and productive work.
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., N h's Curse and Paul's AdM nitin: How the Civil Rights Revolution
Helps Us Understand Recent Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Gay Equality (draft Apr. 2010) (arguing
that public law's endorsement of benign racial variation emboldened religious liberals to discredit
longstanding racist readings of Scripture).
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Table 3. How the Sex, Sexuality, and Gender Cases
Have Transformed the U.S. Constitution
Normative
Regime Constitutional Privacy Equal Protection Clause Free Speech and Association
Identity Outside Dynamic Equality: sliding Identity speech protected,
Marriage: refocus privacy scale scrutiny to classification incl. coming out as
Liberal: Benign around sexual reflecting gender stereotypes transgendered or gay
Sexual/Gender (Lawrence148) + gender (CraigT51 ) or antigay prejudice (PT&T153)
Variation (Eisenstadt!49; Roe 150) (Romer 152 )
choices
Traditionalist: Traditional Liberties: Reserve Strict Scrutiny for Expression Trumps Equality:
Malignant or religious liberty not to Race: sex (Nguyen'
55) and integration of nontraditional
Tolerable associate + rights of sexual orientation (Romer
156) identity/conduct/viewpoint
Sexal/Gender parents (Cey
15 4 ) (Dale57; Christian Legal
Variation discriminations are not as
malignant as apartheid was Soiiety158)
Redefine marriage and Root & Branch Reform: Homophobia and sexism
Post-Liberal: family via privacy equality justifications for ought to follow racism as
Productive discourse (Marriage restructuring workplaces/ ideologies the state does not
SexalGender CQas15 9) schools to be welcoming have to respect (state's
Variation environments for minorities argument in CLS'
6 1)
and women (Hibbst6° )
148. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
150. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
152. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
153. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. PT&T, 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
155. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
156. Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
157. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
158. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, No. 06-15956, 2009 WL 693391 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2009)
(mem.), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3635(U.S. Dec. 7,2009) (No. 08-1371).
159. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436-39 (Cal. 2008).
160. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
161. Christian Legal Society, 2009 WL 693391.
HeinOnline  -- 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1373 2009-2010
HeinOnline  -- 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1374 2009-2010
